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Abstract 
We study the effects of pension reform in a four-period OLG model for an open economy where hours 
worked by three active generations, education of the young, the retirement decision of older workers, 
and aggregate growth, are all endogenous. Within each generation we distinguish individuals with high, 
medium or low ability to build human capital. This extension allows to investigate also the effects of 
pension reform on the income and welfare levels of different ability groups. Particular attention goes to 
the income at old-age and the welfare level of low-ability individuals.  
Our simulation results prefer an intelligent pay-as-you-go pension system above a fully-funded private 
system. When it comes to promoting employment, human capital, growth, and aggregate welfare, 
positive effects in a pay-as-you-go system are the strongest when it includes a tight link between 
individual labor income (and contributions) and the pension, and when it attaches a high weight to labor 
income earned as an older worker to compute the pension assessment base. Such a regime does, 
however, imply welfare losses for the current low-ability generations, and rising inequality in welfare. 
Complementing or replacing this ‘intelligent’ pay-as-you-go system by basic and/or minimum pension 
components is negative for aggregate welfare, employment and growth. Better is to maintain the tight 
link between individual labor income and the pension also for low-ability individuals, but to strongly raise 
their replacement rate. 
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1. Introduction 
Concern for the long-run financial viability of public pension systems has put pension reform high on the 
agenda of policy makers and researchers. The past two decades have seen a wave of reforms in many 
countries (Whitehouse et al., 2009). At the same time the literature on pension economics has grown 
rapidly (see e.g. Lindbeck and Persson, 2003; Barr, 2006; and many recent papers that we refer to 
below). To face the pension challenge, there seems to be general agreement on the need for higher 
employment, especially among older individuals, and higher productivity growth. Many studies have 
documented how the pension system may affect the incentives of individuals of different ages to work 
(e.g. Sheshinski, 1978; Auerbach et al., 1989; Gruber and Wise, 2002; Börsch-Supan and Ludwig, 2010; 
Sommacal, 2006; Fisher and Keuschnigg, 2010; Jaag et al., 2010; de la Croix et al., 2010). Others have 
investigated the relationship between the pension system and investment in human capital formation, 
as a major determinant of productivity growth (e.g. Zhang, 1995; Kemnitz and Wigger, 2000; Zhang and 
Zhang, 2003; Kaganovich and Meier, 2008; Le Garrec, 2012). Still others have demonstrated the crucial 
role of human capital formation to counteract the negative effects of population ageing on per capita 
output (e.g. Docquier and Michel, 1999; Ludwig et al., 2012). Consensus on what pension reform would 
serve the goals of higher employment, productivity growth, and welfare best, has however not been 
reached. The results in some papers support parametric adjustments in the pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system 
that most countries rely on. Other papers prefer a gradual move to an actuarially neutral fully-funded 
private system. Often, differences in the particular specification of the model economy that is used for 
the analysis may explain the differences in results (Buyse et al., 2011). 
The above mentioned literature has strongly improved our understanding of the effects of pension 
systems on employment, education and growth. Still, it is limited in some respects. First of all, about all 
existing studies either investigate incentives to work in a model with exogenous human capital and 
growth, or investigate human capital and growth while ignoring the labor-leisure choice and the 
endogeneity of labor supply. Buyse et al. (2011) and Ludwig et al. (2012) are exceptions
1
. These two 
studies also clearly demonstrate the importance of modelling the many mutual relationships between 
key variables. For example, if policy can make people postpone retirement and work longer, the return 
to investment in education will rise, and so may human capital and growth. Conversely, policies that 
promote education will also encourage people to work longer since they will then get a higher return 
from their investment. Also, if pension reform discourages employment of the young, it may still be 
positive if this contributes to education and growth. For a proper assessment of the effects of pension 
reform it is important to take such interactions into account.  
 Second, with the exception of Sommacal (2006) who distinguishes exogenous fractions of skilled 
and unskilled workers, the above mentioned literature disregards differences in abilities and capacity of 
people to learn. Models with education and growth typically assume that everyone is able to study and 
succeed in education. Reality is different, however. Data reveal that in 2008 about 30% of the 25-64 year 
old population on average in the OECD had no upper secondary degree. About 44% had an upper 
secondary degree but no tertiary degree. The fraction of people with a tertiary degree therefore 
                                                          
1
 Ludwig et al. (2012) develop a model with endogenous employment by age and human capital, but they have 
exogenous growth. Buyse et al. (2011) also have endogenous growth.  
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remained below 30%. Among young cohorts, educational attainment is higher. Yet, the fraction that 
does not complete upper secondary education is still about 20% on average. About 40% obtains an 
upper secondary degree, but no tertiary degree. More or less another 40% completes both secondary 
and tertiary education (OECD, Education at a Glance, Tables A1, A2.2, A3.2). The simple fact that innate 
ability as for example reflected by IQ varies across people, implies that one can never expect everyone to 
succeed at the secondary, let alone the tertiary level.  
In this paper we study pension reform in a general equilibrium four-period OLG model where hours of 
work of young, middle aged and older individuals, education and human capital formation of the young, 
the retirement decision of the older generation, and aggregate per capita growth are all endogenous. 
We build on our earlier work in Buyse et al. (2011). The model includes a public PAYG old-age pension 
system which pays out pensions to a fourth generation of retired. The statutory retirement age in the 
model is 65 and exogenous. Old-age pensions are paid from this age onwards. Individuals, however, may 
optimally choose a lower effective (early) retirement age. They then receive early retirement benefits. 
Our main innovation in this paper is to introduce heterogeneous abilities. We make the assumption that 
within each generation three ability groups exist. These groups differ both in the degree to which they 
(when young) assimilate existing knowledge, i.e. inherit human capital from the middle aged generation, 
and in their productivity of schooling when they spend time studying. One group has low ability. They 
inherit relatively little human capital from the middle aged generation, and will never engage in tertiary 
education. They will only work or have ‘leisure’. A second group has medium ability, a third group high 
ability. These groups inherit higher fractions of existing human capital, and do allocate time to tertiary 
education. Given the variation between them in the productivity of schooling, this amount of time will 
differ, however.  
Our aim is then to investigate the effects of various parametric adjustments in the old-age PAYG pension 
system on the employment rate of young, middle aged and older workers, education, growth and 
welfare. These parametric adjustments include changes in benefit levels, changes in the link between 
benefits and individual contributions, and changes in the weights of the three active periods in the 
computation of the old-age pension assessment base, i.e. earned labor income used to calculate pension 
benefits. We also consider the effects of moving to full private capital funding. An advantage of 
realistically introducing heterogeneous abilities, and therefore an important contribution of this paper, is 
that we will be able to study differential effects of pension reform on the income and welfare levels of 
individuals with different abilities and human capital. Particular attention goes to the income at old-age 
and the welfare level of the low-ability individuals. The link to a major issue as old-age poverty (see e.g. 
Kidd and Whitehouse, 2009) is obvious.  
Our results prefer an ‘intelligent’ PAYG system above a fully-funded private system. When it comes to 
promoting employment, human capital, growth, and aggregate welfare, we find positive effects in a 
PAYG system to be the strongest when it includes a tight link between individual labor income (and 
contributions) and the pension, and when it attaches a high weight to labor income earned as an older 
worker to compute the pension assessment base. Pension reform in this direction encourages young 
individuals to study and build human capital, which promotes long-run growth. Furthermore, it 
encourages older workers to postpone retirement. Strengthening the link between one’s future old-age 
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pension, on the one hand, and one’s human capital and labor supply when older, on the other, 
introduces strong financial incentives which may bring about important changes in behavior. In this 
sense, our results fully confirm those of Buyse et al. (2011). However, our paper also sharply clarifies the 
limitations of neglecting heterogeneity in people’s ability. We find that the above described ‘intelligent’ 
PAYG system implies welfare losses for the current low-ability generations who cannot study and who 
earn low wages. Aggregate welfare inequality rises strongly. Complementing or replacing this system by 
basic and/or minimum pension components promotes welfare of the current and (maybe some) future 
low-ability generations, but it is negative for aggregate welfare, employment and growth. Labor supply 
and employment among low-ability individuals in particular fall sharply. Better is to maintain the tight 
link between individual labor income and the pension also for low-ability individuals, but to significantly 
raise their replacement rate.  
 
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we document differences in employment by age, 
education of the young, the effective retirement age, and per capita growth across 13 OECD countries 
since 1995. Section 3 sets out our model. Next to the pension system, we introduce a role for education 
quality as well as a rich fiscal policy block. The government in the model sets tax rates on labor, capital 
and consumption. It allocates its revenue to productive expenditures (mainly for education), 
consumption, ‘non-employment’ benefits (including early retirement benefits), old-age pensions, and 
interest payments on outstanding debt. In Section 4 we calibrate the model on actual data and confront 
its predictions with the facts described in Section 2. Section 5 includes the results of a range of model 
simulations. We investigate the steady state employment, education and growth effects of various 
reforms of the pension system. We also study welfare effects per generation and per ability group. 
Section 6 concludes the paper.   
 
2. Cross-country differences in employment, tertiary education and per capita growth 
Table 1 contains key data on employment, education and growth in 13 OECD countries in 1995-2007. 
One would like a reliable model to match the main cross-country differences reported here. The 
employment rate in hours () indicates the fraction of potential hours that are actually being worked by 
the average person in one of three age groups (20-34, 35-49, 50-64). Comparable data for hours worked 
by ability type (skill level) are not available. Potential hours are 2080 per person per year (52 weeks 
times 40 hours per week). The observed employment rate rises if more people in an age group have a 
job, and if the employed work more hours. The employment rate in the age group of 50 to 64 is also 
affected by the average age at which older workers withdraw from the labor force. We include the 
effective retirement age in the Table. In most countries, this age is well below the official age to receive 
old-age pensions (65 in most countries, 60 in France and Italy). The education rate () is our proxy for the 
fraction of time spent studying by the average person of age 20-34. It has been calculated as the total 
number of students in full-time equivalents, divided by total population in this age group. Our data for 
(average annual) real per capita growth concern real potential GDP per person of working age. We refer 
to Appendix 1 for details on the calculation of our data, and on the assumptions that we have to make. 
As is well-known, middle aged individuals work most hours, followed by the young. The older generation 
works the lowest number of hours. Average employment rates across countries in these three age groups 
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Table 1  
Employment rate in hours () by age, effective retirement age, education rate () and per capita growth 
in OECD countries (1995-2006/7)  
  
(20-34) 
 
(35-49) 
 
(50-64) 
Effective 
retirement 
age
 
  Annual real per 
capita growth 
       
Austria 59.9 64.3 34.7 59.5 12.5 2.06 
Belgium 51.1 56.8 29.3 57.9 14.1 1.77 
France 48.7 60.3 38.0 58.8 14.9 1.54 
Germany 49.7 55.2 34.9 61.1 17.2 1.56 
Italy 50.1 61.9 33.8 60.1 12.6 1.30 
Netherlands 50.8 54.6 34.2 60.0 14.7 2.20 
Core euro 
area average 
 
51.7 58.8 34.2 59.6 14.3 1.74 
Denmark 56.2 66.7 49.6 62.2 21.7 1.81 
Finland 55.6 69.0 47.3 60.2 23.1 2.72 
Norway 51.9 60.9 50.6 63.1 18.1 2.29 
Sweden 53.6 66.1 55.4 63.4 17.7 2.18 
Nordic 
Average 
 
54.3 65.6 50.7 62.2 20.2 2.25 
US 65.6 74.2 59.6 64.2 12.8 1.54 
       
UK 60.8 68.4 49.4 62.0 12.3 2.13 
Canada 60.9 69.5 50.4 62.1 13.6 1.68 
       
All country 
Average 
55.0 63.7 43.6 61.1 15.8 1.91 
    
Data sources: OECD (see Appendix 1); data description: see main text and Appendix 1. The data for employment 
and growth concern 1995-2007, those for education 1995-2006. The effective retirement age is an average for 
1995-2006. All data are in percent, except the retirement age. 
 
are 55.0%, 63.7% and 43.6% respectively. Furthermore, the data reveal strong cross-country differences. 
We observe the highest employment rates in each age group in the US. Employment rates are much 
lower in the core countries of the euro area. The Nordic countries take intermediate positions, although 
they are close to the core euro area for the younger generation. The latter, however, seems to be related 
to education. Young people’s effective participation in education is also by far the highest in the Nordic 
countries. These countries also show the highest potential per capita growth rates. On average, growth 
in the core euro area and the US was more than 0.5 percentage points lower in the period under 
consideration. The US and the other Anglo-Saxon countries tend to have the lowest participation in 
education among people of age 20 to 34. Finally, we note that the effective retirement age also varies 
across countries. The retirement age is quite low in Belgium (57.9) and France (58.8). By contrast, 
individuals in Nordic or Anglo-Saxon countries participate longer. Unsurprisingly, correlation between 
the effective retirement age and the employment rate among older workers () is very high (0.89).   
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3. The model 
 
Our analytical framework consists of a computable four-period OLG-model for a small open economy. 
We assume perfect international mobility of physical capital but immobile labor and human capital. 
Seminal work in the OLG tradition has been done by Samuelson (1958) and Diamond (1965). Auerbach 
and Kotlikoff (1987) initiated the study of public finance shocks in a computable OLG model. Buiter and 
Kletzer (1993) developed an open economy version of the model with endogenous growth, putting 
human capital at the centre. As we have documented in Section 1, a large literature has used OLG 
models to study the behavioral effects of the pension system either on employment assuming 
exogenous growth, or on human capital and growth ignoring the labor-leisure choice and assuming 
exogenous employment. New in this paper is that we explain both employment by age, and human 
capital and growth as jointly endogenous variables and that we realistically take into account differences 
in individuals’ innate abilities. 
 
We consider three active adult generations, the young, the middle aged and the older, and one 
generation of retired agents. Within each generation we assume three types of individuals with different 
ability a to build human capital: a group  with high ability, a group  with medium ability and a group  	 with low ability. The last group will never enter into tertiary education. We assume that the three 
ability groups are of equal size, and so are the different generations. We normalize each ability group to 
1, so that the size of a generation is 3, and total population is 12, and constant
2
. Individuals enter the 
model at age 20. Each period is modeled to last for 15 years. High and medium ability young people can 
choose either to work and generate labor income, to study and build human capital, or to devote time to 
‘leisure’ (including other non-market activities). Low ability young individuals and all middle aged and 
older workers do not study anymore, they only work or have ‘leisure’. The statutory old-age retirement 
age in our model is 65. Individuals may however optimally choose to leave the labor force sooner in a 
regime of early retirement.  
 
Output is produced by domestic firms which act competitively and employ physical capital together with 
existing technology and effective labor provided by the three active generations. A final important 
assumption is that education generates a positive externality in the sense of Azariadis and Drazen (1990). 
Each young generation inherits a fraction of the average level of human capital of a middle aged 
generation. The higher an individual’s ability, the larger the fraction he inherits. In what follows, we 
concentrate on the core elements of the model: the optimizing behavior of individuals, the production 
and inheritance of effective human capital, the behavior of domestic firms and the determination of 
aggregate output and growth, capital and wages.    
 
3.1. Individuals 
 
An individual with ability 
 (
 = , , 	) reaching age 20 in period t maximizes an intertemporal utility 
function of the form: 
                                                          
2
 Assuming demography and population to be constant may seem strange given that ageing is a crucial factor 
behind pension reform in many countries. Note however that this assumption is not uncommon (see also Jaag et 
al., 2010; Fisher and Keuschnigg, 2010; Buyse et al., 2011). Moreover, and most importantly, it need not be a 
limitation to disentangle behavioral effects from different routes of pension reform. 
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 = ∑  ln  +  ℓ  !     ∀
 = , , 	          (1) 
 
with 0 < β < 1, &'  > 0,θ > 0 (θ ≠ 1) and where we shall impose that 
 ℓ = 1 −  −             (2) ℓ = 1 −             (3) 
ℓ = , -./ (1 − 0 )12 + (1 − .)(1 − / )123
2241          (4) 
ℓ  = 1 and 5 = 0.   
 
Superscript t indicates the period of youth, when the individual comes into the model. Subscript j refers 
to the jth period of life and a refers to the ‘ability type’. Lifetime utility depends on consumption ( )  
and enjoyed leisure (ℓ ) in each period of life. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution in 
consumption is 1, the intertemporal elasticity to substitute leisure 

. Finally,  is the discount factor and 
γ  specifies the relative value of leisure versus consumption. The preference parameters θ,β and γ do not 
depend on ability type. Note, however, that γ may be different in each period of life. Except for the latter 
assumption, our specification of the instantaneous utility function is quite common in the macro 
literature (e.g. Benhabib and Farmer, 1994; Rogerson, 2007).  
 
Equations (2)-(4) describe the individual’s enjoyed leisure in each of the four periods of his life. For a 
proper understanding we summarize his life-cycle in Figure 1. Time endowment in each period is 
normalized to 1. Next to leisure, individuals devote time to work ( ) in their three active periods and to 
education ( ) when young. In the first period of active life, leisure therefore falls in labor supply and in 
education time. Only the low ability individuals do not study (5 = 0). In the second and third period 
leisure falls in labor supply only. A key element in the individuals’ optimal choice of leisure time in the 
third period of life (50-65) is the determination of early retirement. Individuals choose /  which relates 
to the optimal effective retirement age and which is defined as the fraction of time between age 50 and 
65 that the individual participates in the labor market; (1 − /  ) is then time in early retirement. We use   to denote the fraction of time devoted to work between 50 and 65, and 0  as the fraction of time 
devoted to work before early retirement, but after 50. As labor market exit is irreversible and post-
retirement employment is not allowed in our model, the relationship between use   and 0  is as 
follows:  = / . 0 . In the third period, leisure time thus consists of two parts: non-employment time 
before the effective retirement age / (1 − 0 ), and time in early retirement after it (1 − /  ). Equation 
(4) then describes composite enjoyed leisure of an older worker as a CES-function of both parts (see also 
Buyse et al., 2011). We assume imperfect substitutability between the two leisure types. The idea here is 
that leisure time after and between periods of work is not the same as leisure time in periods when 
individuals are not economically active anymore
3
. Equation (4) expresses that individuals prefer to have a 
                                                          
3
 The former may be particularly valuable from the perspective of relaxation and time to spend on personal 
activities of short duration. The latter may be valuable to enjoy activities which take more time and ask for longer 
term commitment (e.g. long journeys, non-market activity as a volunteer).  
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balanced combination of both rather than an ‘extreme’ amount of one of them (and very little of the 
other). In this equation 7 is the constant elasticity of substitution, μ is a usual share parameter and Γ is 
added as a normalization constant such that the magnitude of ℓ  corresponds to the magnitude of total 
leisure time (1 −  ). The latter assumption allows to interpret γ as the relative value of leisure versus 
consumption in the third period, comparable to & and γ. The main results in this paper are not in any 
way influenced by the magnitude of ., , or 7. 
 
Figure 1. Life-cycle of an individual of generation t and ability a 
 
     
 
Period t t+1 t+2 t+3 
Work      = / 0  0 
Study    0 0 0 
leisure 
time 
1 −  −   1 −   / (1 − 0 ) + (1 − / ) 1 
 Note: 5 = 0. 
 
Individuals will choose consumption, labor supply and education to maximize Equation (1), subject to 
Equations (2)-(4) and the constraints described in (5)-(13). Equations (5)-(8) describe the individuals’ 
dynamic budget constraints. The LHS of these equations shows that individuals allocate their disposable 
income to consumption (including consumption taxes, 9:) and the accumulation of non-human wealth. 
In each equation we denote by Ω  the stock of wealth held by a type 
 individual who enters the model 
at time t at the end of his jth period of life. Equations (5) and (8) respectively indicate that individuals 
start and finish adult life with zero assets. During the three periods of active life, disposable income at 
the RHS includes after-tax labor income, non-employment benefits, interest income and lump sum 
transfers. In each equation, <,=  stands for the real wage per unit of effective labor supplied at time k by 
an individual with ability a, >=  is the exogenous (world) real interest rate at time k, and ?= is the lump 
sum transfer that the government pays out to all individuals at time k. Effective labor of an individual 
with ability a depends on hours worked ( ) and effective human capital (ℎ ). Given the tax rate on 
labor income 9A, young individuals earn an after-tax real wage equal to <,ℎ  (1 − 9A). After-tax 
labor income when middle aged and older in Equations (6) and (7) are determined similarly.  
 (1 + 9:) +  Ω = <,ℎ  (1 − 9A) + B<,ℎ (1 − 9A)(1 −  −  ) + ?      (5)  (1 + 9:) +  Ω = <,Cℎ  (1 − 9A) + B<,Cℎ (1 − 9A)(1 −  )                             +(1 + >C)Ω + ?C        (6)  
20             35            50               65               80 /  
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(1 + 9:) +  Ω = <,Cℎ 0 / (1 − 9A) + B<,Cℎ (1 − 9A)/ (1 − 0 )            +BDE<,Cℎ (1 − 9A)(1 − / ) + (1 + >C)Ω + ?C       (7)  (1 + 9:)  = (1 + >C)Ω + FF + ?C          (8) 
 
For the fraction of time that young, middle aged and older individuals are inactive, they receive a non-
employment benefit from the government. Older workers may be eligible to two kinds of benefits: 
standard non-employment benefits (analogous to what young and middle aged workers receive) as long 
as they are on the labor market, and early retirement benefits after having withdrawn from the labor 
market. All benefits are defined as a proportion of the after-tax wage of a full-time worker. The net 
replacement rate for standard non-employment benefits is B, for early retirement benefits it is BDE4.  
After the statutory retirement age (65) individuals have no labor income and no non-employment 
benefits anymore. They then receive an old-age pension benefit (FF ) and the lump sum transfer. 
Equation (9) describes the old-age pension. We assume a public PAYG pension system in which pensions 
in period k are financed by contributions (labor taxes) from the active generations in that period k (see 
below). Individual net pension benefits consist of two components. A first one is related to the 
individual’s earlier net labor income. It is a fraction of his so-called pension base, i.e. a weighted average 
of revalued net labor income in each of the three active periods of life. The net replacement rate is GA. 
The parameters F, F and F represent the weights attached to each period. This part of the pension 
rises in the individual’s hours of work   and his human capital ℎ . It will be lower when the individual 
retires early (lower / ). Thanks to revaluation, this part of the net pension is adjusted to increases in the 
overall standard of living between the time that workers build their pension entitlements and the time 
that they receive the pension. We assume that past earnings are revalued in line with economy-wide 
wage growth H and hence follow practice in many OECD countries (OECD, 2005; Whiteford and 
Whitehouse, 2006).
5
 The second component of the pension is a flat-rate or basic pension. Every retiree 
receives the same amount related to average net labor income in the economy at the time of 
retirement. This assumption assures that also basic pensions rise in line with productivity. Here, the net 
replacement rate is GI. Fourth generation individuals consume their pension and the lump sum 
transfer, as well as their accumulated wealth from the third period plus interest (Equation 8). They leave 
no debts, nor bequests. 
 
                                                          
4
 Our approach to model early retirement benefits as a function of a worker’s last labor income, similar to standard 
non-employment benefits, reflects regulation and/or common practice in many countries. In some countries (e.g. 
Belgium, the Netherlands) workers can enter the early retirement regime only from employment, with their 
benefits being linked to the last wage. In other countries (e.g. Denmark) there is only access from unemployment, 
with the early retirement benefit being linked to the unemployment benefit. As to common practice, Duval (2003) 
confirms that in many countries, unemployment-related or disability benefits can be used de facto to bridge the 
time between the effective retirement age and old-age pension eligibility. Again there is a link between benefits 
and former wages.  
5
 We explain economy-wide wage growth in Section 3.3. Individuals take it as exogenous. 
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FF = GA ∑ F<,Cℎ  (1 − 9A) ∏ HCKK! !   
   +GI L ∑ ∑ <,CℎC C (1 − 9A)!M,N,5!           (9)  
With:    0 ≤ F ≤ 1  
 ∑ F = 1!    = / 0   
                      
Note that we allow ability-specific pension replacement rates GA  and GI. This specification is in line 
with the data in many countries, which show that the importance of own-income related versus flat 
components may be very different depending on people’s earned income, and therefore ability (see 
Section 4.2. and Table 5 below). For other policy variables like labor tax rates such differences are much 
smaller (Heylen and Van de Kerckhove, 2010). The introduction of ability-specific pension replacement 
rates also allows a richer policy analysis. 
 
Equations (10) and (11) describe the intergenerational transfer of human capital. At the age of 20 a 
young worker with ability  inherits a fraction π  of the average effective human capital of the middle 
aged generation. A young worker with ability  enters our model with only a fraction εNπ , a young 
worker with ability 	 enters with an even lower fraction P5Q. Lower ability may imply more difficulty to 
learn and accumulate knowledge at primary and secondary school (Azariadis and de la Croix, 2002). 
During their second and third period, workers supply more units of effective human capital. It is our 
assumption in Equation (12) that ℎ  , and therefore labour productivity, rise in education time when 
young ( ), productive government spending in percent of GDP (RS, mainly education spending) and an 
overall quality of schooling parameter (T). Individuals take RS and T to be exogenous. Note that the 
human capital accumulation function itself (U) also depends on innate ability. We specify and discuss 
effective human capital production and human capital inheritance in greater detail in Section 3.2. Finally, 
we assume in Equation (13) that human capital remains unchanged between the second and the third 
period. We have in mind that learning by doing in work may counteract depreciation. 
 
 ℎ = PQ VWXY41CVWZY41CVW[Y41    ∀ 
 = , , 	           (10) 0 < Q, 0 < P5 < PN < PM = 1           (11) 
ℎ = 1 + U , RS , T ℎ ,          U > 0, U\ > 0          (12) ℎ = ℎ ,          ∀ 
 = , , 	           (13)  
Substituting Equations (2)-(4) for ℓ  and (5)-(8) for   into (1), and maximizing with respect to Ω , Ω , Ω ,  ,  , 0 , /  and  , yields eight first order conditions for the optimal behavior of an 
individual with ability a entering the model at time t. Equation (14) expresses the law of motion of 
optimal consumption over the lifetime. Equations (15.a), (15.b) and (15.c) describe the optimal labor-
leisure choice in each period of active live. Individuals supply labor up to the point where the marginal 
utility of leisure equals the marginal utility gain from work. The latter consists of two parts. Working 
more hours in a particular period raises additional resources for consumption both in that period and 
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when retired. The marginal utility gain from work rises when the marginal utility of consumption (1/ ) 
is higher, and when an extra hour of work yields more extra consumption. Higher human capital (and its 
underlying determinants), lower taxes on labor, lower taxes on consumption and lower non-employment 
benefits contribute to the gain from work. Extra consumption during retirement rises in the own-income- 
related pension replacement rate (GA), in the weight attached to the relevant period when computing 
the pension base (F), and in the revaluation parameters. Equations (15.a)-(15.c) highlight positive 
substitution effects from the pension replacement rate GA. To the extent that higher replacement rates 
raise individuals’ consumption possibilities ( ), they also cause adverse income effects on labor supply. 
Basic pensions (GI) do not directly occur in Equations (15), but they do affect employment via this 
income effect. 
 
 
:^1,_Y:_Y = 1 + >C,          ∀ ' = 1,2,3           (14)  
1
ℓ1_Y b
cℓ1_Ycd1_Y = A_,YV1_
Y (ef)(g):1_Y (Ceh) + ³ G<
j1A_,YV1_
Y (ef)kYkY^1kY^W:l_Y (Ceh)         (15.a)  
 
W
ℓW_Y b
cℓW_YcdW_Y = A_,Y^1Cm_D1_
Y ,no,pV1_Y (ef)(g)
:W_Y (Ceh)  
                + ² G<
jWA_,Y^1Cm_D1_Y ,no,pV1_Y (ef)kY^1kY^W:l_Y (Ceh)         (15.b)  
r
ℓr_Y b
cℓr_Ycd0r_Y = A_,Y^WCm_D1_
Y ,no,pV1_Y s_Y (ef)(g)
:r_Y (Ceh)   
                +  G<
jrA_,Y^WCm_D1_Y ,no,pV1_Y s_Y (ef)kY^W:l_Y (Ceh)          (15.c) 
 
Equation (16) describes the first order condition for the optimal effective retirement age. The LHS 
represents the utility loss from postponing retirement. Later retirement reduces enjoyed leisure as early 
retiree, but raises enjoyed leisure in between periods of work for given work time 0 . The RHS shows 
the marginal utility gain from postponing retirement. This marginal gain follows from consuming the 
extra labor income (vis-à-vis the early retirement benefit) in the third period, and the higher future old-
age pension after 65. The latter effect rises in GA  and F. 
 
 
r
ℓr_Y b
cℓr_Ycs_Y = A_,Y^WCm_D1_
Y ,no,pV1_Y (ef)d0r_Y Cg(d0r_Y )gtu
:r_Y (Ceh)   
               + G<
jrA_,Y^WCm_D1_Y ,no,pV1_Y d0r_Y (ef)kY^W:l_Y (Ceh)         (16) 
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Finally, Equation (17) imposes for high and medium ability individuals that the marginal utility loss from 
investing in human capital when young equals the total discounted marginal utility gain in later periods 
from having more human capital. Individuals will study more the higher future versus current after-tax 
real wages and the higher the marginal return of education to human capital  cm_cD1_Y . Labor taxes during 
youth therefore encourage individuals to study, whereas labor taxes in later periods of active life 
discourage them. Notice also that high benefit replacement rates in later periods, and a high income-
related pension replacement rate (GA), combined with high weights F and F, will encourage young 
individuals to study. The reason is that any future benefits and the future pension rise in future labor 
income, and therefore human capital. A final interesting result is that young people study more – all 
other things equal – if they expect to work harder in later periods (  ,  = / . 0 ). 
 
  
1
ℓ1_Y b
cℓ1_YcD1_Y − :1_Y c:1_
Y
cD1_Y =  :W_Y c:W_
Y
cD1_Y +  :r_Y c:r_
Y
cD1_Y +  :l_Y c:l_
Y
cD1_Y    ∀
 = ,              (17) 
 
with:    
c:1_YcD1_Y = − gA_,YV1_
Y (ef)Ceh  
 
c:W_YcD1_Y = cm_D1_
Y ,no,pcD1_Y
A_,Y^1V1_Y (ef)vdW_Y CgdW_Y wCeh  
 
c:r_YcD1_Y = cm_D1_
Y ,no,pcD1_Y
A_,Y^WV1_Y (ef)vs_Y d0r_Y (g)CggtuCgtuwCeh  
 
c:l_YcD1_Y = G<
 cm_D1_
Y ,no,pcD1_Y
∑ jd_Y A_,Y^41V1_Y (ef) ∏ kY^x41rxy ryW
Ceh  
 
It will be obvious from the above discussion that (for a given way of financing) the specific organization 
of pension benefits may have strong effects on behavior in earlier periods of life. Both income and 
substitution effects occur. The latter are particularly rich when pensions are linked to individuals’ own 
labor income. A higher replacement rate GA raises the return to working (, for all ability groups) and to 
building human capital (, ℎ, for high and medium-ability individuals) in earlier periods. Changes in the 
particular weight attached to these earlier periods may modify these incentive effects. The return to 
education will rise in F and F, but fall in F. The return to working in the third period will rise in F, etc. 
Policy makers may change all these parameters. We investigate the effects of policy interventions in 
Section 5.  
 
3.2. Inheritance and production of effective human capital  
Equations (10) and (11) above assume that when entering the model young workers with high ability 
inherit a fraction π of the average effective human capital of the middle aged generation. The value of π 
is to be calibrated. Individuals with medium and lower ability inherit less (ε5 < PN < 1). OECD PISA 
scores leave no doubt. On average over the 13 countries that we focus on in this paper, the test scores 
for science of students at the 17th and the 50th percentiles are 67.3% and 83.7% respectively of the test 
score of students at the 83
th
 percentile. We take these numbers as proxies for ε5 and εN  (see also 
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Section 4). After entering the model, young individuals may decide to study and accumulate more 
human capital. The specification and parameterization of the human capital production function ψ(. ) in 
Equation (12) is often a problem in numerical endogenous growth models. In contrast to goods 
production functions, there is not much empirical evidence and no consensus about the determinants of 
human capital growth, nor about the underlying functional form and parameter values. The literature 
shows a variety of functions, typically including one or two of the following inputs: individual time 
allocated to education, private expenditures on education by individuals themselves or by their parents, 
and government expenditures on education (e.g. Lucas, 1988, Glomm and Ravikumar, 1992; Docquier 
and Michel, 1999, Kaganovich and Zilcha, 1999; Bouzahzah et al., 2002; Ludwig et al., 2012). In case of 
two inputs, the adopted functional form is very often Cobb-Douglas (e.g. Glomm and Ravikumar, 1992; 
Kaganovich and Zilcha, 1999; Docquier and Michel, 1999).  
 
Our specification of the human capital production function also includes education time of young 
individuals and education expenditures by the government as indicators for the quantity of invested 
private and public resources. Compared to most of the literature, however, we differ in three respects. 
First, we adopt a more flexible CES functional form, allowing the elasticity of substitution to differ from 
1. Second, our definition of relevant government expenditures includes more than education. It also 
includes active labor market expenditures, public R&D expenditures and public fixed investment. This 
approach goes back to our use of the broader concept of effective human capital
6
. Our third extension is 
to take into account the quality of education and the schooling system. We recognize that better quality 
implies higher cognitive skills for the same allocation of resources. Young individuals’ capacity to build 
human capital will then rise.  
 
All these arguments find their way in Equations (18.a) and (18.b). The former shows the growth rate of 
effective human capital for high and medium ability individuals as a CES specification in education time 
when young ( ) and productive government expenditures in % of output (RS). In steady state both 
determinants are constant, which will imply constant steady state growth. We add the quality of the 
schooling system (T) in a multiplicative way. We will use country-specific PISA science scores as a proxy 
for q.
7
 Next to T we introduce (constant common) technical parameters: φ  is a positive efficiency 
parameter reflecting natural ability, σ  a scale parameter, z a share parameter and κ the elasticity of 
substitution. These parameters will be calibrated. Note in Equation (18.b) that low ability individuals 
supply no education time, but they also enjoy positive effects on their effective human capital  from 
productive government expenditures. The quality of the schooling system T also plays a role here. 
 
                                                          
6
 As in Dhont and Heylen (2009), effective human capital (and worker productivity) rise not only in accumulated 
schooling or training, but also in the productive efficiency of accumulated schooling. Education and active labor 
market expenditures contribute directly to more human capital being accumulated, public R&D and fixed 
investment expenditures will mainly raise the productive efficiency of accumulated human capital. 
7
 Ideally, one would employ a quality indicator relating to tertiary education, but this is not (yet) available. Still, PISA 
scores may be very useful. They are informative about the quality that young people attain in secondary education, 
and with which some enter tertiary education. Quality at entrance should have a positive effect on people’s 
capacity to learn and to raise human capital in tertiary education. Furthermore, PISA scores have been found 
empirically significant for growth (Hanushek and Woessmann, 2009).  
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U, RS, T = {T |zRS1} + (1 − z)
1}~
41    ∀
 = ,              (18.a) 
U5RS , T = {5TRS                (18.b) 
 
Lack of existing empirical evidence makes an ex-ante assessment of our specification very difficult. In 
previous work, however, we have been able to verify that a specification like (18.a) performs better than 
alternative ones without quality, with a narrower definition of government expenditures, or with a 
different functional form (see Heylen and Van de Kerckhove, 2010; Buyse et al., 2011). 
 
3.3. Domestic firms, output and factor prices 
Firms act competitively on output and input markets and maximize profits. All firms are identical. Total 
domestic output () is given by the production function (19). Technology exhibits constant returns to 
scale in aggregate physical capital () and effective labor (), so that profits are zero in equilibrium. 
Equation (20) defines total effective labor as a CES aggregate of effective labor supplied by the three 
ability groups. In this equation s is the elasticity of substitution between the different ability types of 
labor and M , N and 5  are the input shares. We will impose that M = 1 − N − 5. 
  =                  (19) 
  = |MM,
1 + NN,
1 + 55,
1~
41                (20) 
 
Equation (21) specifies effective labor per ability group. Within each ability group we assume perfect 
substitutability of labor supplied by the different age groups.  
 , =  ℎ + ℎ + ℎ      
        =  +   k_Y41kY41 +   k_
Y4W
kY41kY4W ℎ     ∀
 = , , 	            (21) 
 
To derive Equation (21) we make use of Equations (12) and (13) where we define: 
1 + U , RS , T ≡ H                  (22)  
It then follows that:  ℎ = ℎ = Hℎ   ∀
 = , , 	.   
Furthermore, we exploit the result that
8
 : 
                                                          
8
 Starting from Equation (10), and using (11), (12) and (22), it is easy to see that: 
 ℎM = Q VWXY41CVWZY41CVW[Y41 = Q kXY41V1XY41CkZY41V1ZY41Ck[Y41V1[Y41 = Q (kXY41CZkZY41C[k[Y41) ℎM = HℎM.  
Human capital of the lower ability individuals (
 =  , 	) will grow at the same rate V1_YV1_Y41 = _V1X
Y
_V1XY41 = V1X
Y
V1XY41 which 
explains the first part of Equation (23). Lagging this result by one period, generates the second part. 
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 ℎ = Hℎ = HHℎ,                    (23) 
 
where by definition: H ≡ Q kXY CZkZY C[k[Y  .  
 
Substituting Equation (21) for 
 = ,  and 	 into (20), and recognizing differences in the capacity P to 
inherit human capital as indicated by Equations (10) and (11), yields Equation (24).  
 
 = ∑ P1  +  k_Y41kY41 +  k_
Y4W
kY41kY4W
1!M,N,5 
41 ℎM                 (24) 
 
Competitive behavior implies in Equation (25) that firms carry physical capital to the point where its 
after-tax marginal product net of depreciation equals the world real interest rate. Physical capital 
depreciates at rate =. Capital taxes are source-based: the tax rate τk applies to the country in which the 
capital is used, regardless of who owns it. The real interest rate being given, firms will install more capital 
when the amount of effective labor increases or the capital tax rate falls. In that case the net return to 
investment in the home country rises above the world interest rate, and capital flows in. Furthermore, 
perfect competition implies for each ability type equality between the real wage and the marginal 
product of effective labor (Equation 26). Workers of a particular ability type will earn a higher real wage 
when their supply is relatively scarce and when physical capital per unit of aggregate effective labor is 
higher. Taking into account (25), real wages per unit of effective labor will therefore fall in the world real 
interest rate and in domestic capital tax rates. 
 
 MYY
 − = (1 − 9=) = >                  (25) 
(1 − ) YMY
  - MYM_,Y3
1 = <,     ∀
 = , , 	         (26) 
 
 
Substituting (24) for  and (25) for /, we can rewrite (19) as  
 = YMY
           
     =  (e})EYC}(e})
14 ∑ P1  +  k_Y41kY41 +  k_
Y4W
kY41kY4W
1!M,N,5 
41 ℎM       
 
If we finally recognize that in steady state >, 9= , H,  and  are constant, we obtain the long-run (per 
capita) growth rate of the economy as 
 
  YY41 =   V1X
Y
V1XY41 = (H)  
     =  |Q CmXD1XY41,no,pCZCmZD1ZY41,no,pC[C m[no,p ~            (27) 
 
16 
 
In line with earlier models (e.g., Lucas, 1988; Azariadis and Drazen, 1990; Buiter and Kletzer, 1993), the 
long-run (per capita) growth rate is positively related to the quality of schooling (T) and to the fraction of 
time that young people allocate to education (). It is also positively related to the share of productive 
government expenditures (RS), like in Barro (1990). Growth will rise also if young individuals incorporate 
a larger fraction of average human capital of the middle aged generation (π, P
 ).   
 
3.4. Government 
Equation (28) describes the government’s budget constraint. Productive expenditures S, consumption :, benefits related to non-employment  (including early retirement benefits), old-age pension 
benefits , lump sum transfers   and interest payments > are financed by taxes on labor d, taxes 
on capital =, and taxes on consumption : and/or by new debt ΔC. We define  as outstanding 
public debt at the beginning of period t. 
 
 ΔC = C −  = S + : +  +  +  + > − d − = − :      (28) 
 
with:  S = RS  
 : = R:  
  = M, + N, + 5, 
  = M, + N, + 5, 
  = 12? 
 d = dM, + dN, + d5, 
 = = 9=( − =) 
 : =  9: ∑ MC + NC + 5C !  
 
And ∀
 = , , 	:     
 
 , = (1 −  −  )B<,ℎ (1 − 9A) + (1 −  )B<,ℎ(1 − 9A) 
            +/(1 − 0)B<,ℎ(1 − 9A) + (1 − /)BDE<,ℎ(1 − 9A)  
 , = GA ∑ F<,C ℎ(1 − 9A) ∏ HCK K! !   
               +GI L ∑ ∑ <,ℎCC(1 − 9A)!M,N,5!   
 d, = ∑ C<,ℎC9A!   
 
 
Note our assumption that each ability group has size 1 and that each generation has size 3. Following 
Turnovsky (2000) and Dhont and Heylen (2009), we assume that the government claims given fractions RS and R: of output for productive expenditures and consumption. Non-employment benefits () are 
an unconditional source of income support related to inactivity (leisure) and non-market household 
activities. Although it may seem strange to have such transfers in a model without involuntary 
unemployment, one can of course analyse their employment and growth effects as a theoretical 
benchmark case (see also Rogerson, 2007; Dhont and Heylen, 2008, 2009). Moreover, there is also clear 
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practical relevance. Unconditional or quasi unconditional benefits to structurally non-employed people 
are a fact of life in many European countries. Note also our assumption that the pension system is fully 
integrated into government accounts. We do not impose a specific financing of the PAYG pension plan, 
the government can use resources from the general budget to finance pensions. Finally, as we have 
mentioned before, the government pays the same lump sum transfer ?   to all individuals living at time t. 
 
3.5. Aggregate equilibrium and the current account 
Optimal behavior by firms and households, and government spending for productive and consumption 
purposes, underlie aggregate domestic demand for consumption and investment goods in the economy. 
Our assumption that the economy is open implies that aggregate domestic demand may differ from 
supply and income, which generates international capital flows and imbalance on the current account. 
Equation (29) describes aggregate equilibrium as it can be derived from Equations (5)-(8), defined for all 
generations living at time t, Equations (19)-(21), (25)-(26) and (28). The LHS of (29) represents national 
income. It is the sum of domestic output  and net factor income from abroad >, with  being net 
foreign assets at the beginning of t. The aggregate stock of wealth   accumulates wealth held by 
individuals who entered the model in t-1, t-2 and t-3. At the RHS of (29) ¡  stands for the current 
account in period t. 
 
  + > = ¡ + ¢ + : + S + ¡                  (29) 
  
with:   =   −  −  ¡  = C −  = Δ C − ΔC − ΔC  ¢ = ΔC + =  
 
4. Parameterization and empirical relevance of the model  
The economic environment described above allows us to simulate the transitory and steady state growth 
and employment effects of various changes in fiscal policy and the pension system. This simulation 
exercise requires us first to parameterize and solve the model. In Section 4.1 we discuss our choice of 
preference and technology parameters. Starting from actual cross-country policy data in Section 4.2, we 
compare in Section 4.3 our model’s predictions with the employment and growth differences that we 
have reported in Table 1. This comparison provides a first and simple test of our model’s empirical 
relevance. In Section 5 we consider long-run equilibrium effects of policy changes, as well as welfare 
effects per generation and ability group. To solve the model and to perform the simulations, we choose 
an algorithm that preserves the non-linear nature of our model. We follow the methodology basically 
proposed by Boucekkine (1995) and implemented by Juillard (1996) in the program Dynare. We use 
Dynare 4.2. 
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Table 2 Basic parameterization and benchmark equilibrium 
 
Technology and preference parameters
 
Goods production (output)  = 0.285, ¥ = 1.5, M = 0.47, N = 0.30, 5 = 0.23  
Effective human capital {M = 5.34, {N = 4.66, {5 = 2.83, z = 0.125, © = 0.375, ª = 0.6 
Human capital inheritance Q = 0.85, PN = 0.837, P5 = 0.673  
Preference parameters  =  0.80, « = 2, & = 0.070, & = 0.126, & = 0.170  
 . = 0.5, 7 = 1.54, , = 2  
World real interest rate > = 0.935  
Capital depreciation rate = = 0.714  
 Target values for calibration 
Employment, growth and education 
(a)
    / F> 
F­®
 
¯
 R>°<®ℎ  
51.1% 56.8% 29.3% 57.9 1.77% 14.2% 
      
Relative wages US 
(b)
 <5ℎ5/<MℎM <NℎN/<MℎM <5ℎ5/<MℎM <NℎN/<MℎM 
0.43 0.63 0.38 0.58 
Notes:  (a) Values for Belgium, see Table 1;  
(b) As a proxy for the relative wage of low-ability (medium-ability) young workers, we use available data on earnings of 
workers of age 25-34 with below upper secondary education (secondary education) in the US relative to earnings of 
workers with a tertiary degree. For the relative wage of middle aged workers, we use the same kind of data. However, 
since middle age-specific data are missing, we use average values for the whole age group 25-64 as a proxy. Data for 
the age group 55-64 are about the same (0.38 and 0.55). Data source: OECD Education at a Glance, 2009, Table A7.1. 
 
 
4.1. Preference and technology parameters 
Table 2 contains an overview of all parameters. We set the rate of time preference equal to 1.5% per 
year. Considering that periods in our model consist of 15 years, this choice implies a discount factor β  
equal to 0.8. In the production function we assume a capital share coefficient α  equal to 0.285. The 
elasticity of substitution ¥ between the different ability types of effective labor is set equal to 1.5. Our 
values for the rate of time preference and the capital share are well within the range of values imposed 
in the literature (e.g. Docquier and Michel, 1999; Altig et al., 2001; Heijdra and Romp, 2009). So is the 
value for s. The empirical labor literature consistently documents values between 1 and 2 (see Caselli 
and Coleman, 2006). There is more controversy about the value of the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution in leisure (

). Micro studies often reveal very low elasticities. However, given our macro 
focus, these studies may not be the most relevant ones (Rogerson and Wallenius, 2009; Fiorito and 
Zanella, 2012). Rogerson (2007) also adopts a macro framework. He puts forward a reasonable range for 
θ  from 1 to 3 (Rogerson, 2007, p. 12). In line with this, we impose θ  to be equal to 2. The world real 
interest rate is assumed constant and equal to 4.5% per year. Considering a period of 15 years, this 
implies that > = 0.935. Finally, we set the physical capital depreciation rate to 8% per year, which implies ==0.714. These values are also within the range of existing studies (see e.g. Heijdra and Romp, 2009).  
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A second series of ten parameters have been determined by calibration: three taste for leisure 
parameters (γ, γ, γ), the human capital inheritance parameter (π), three efficiency parameters in the 
human capital production function ({M, {N and {5), the elasticity of substitution (7) in the composite 
leisure function in Equation (4) and two share parameters in aggregate effective labor (N and 5, where M follows as 1 − 5 − N). The ten target values to which these parameters have been calibrated are 
reported at the bottom of Table 2. Six of them concern the employment rates, the effective retirement 
age, education, and growth for Belgium in our study. We choose this country since in Belgium the 
calculation of pension benefits fits exactly within the way we model it. Public pensions are proportional 
to average annual labor income earned over a period of 45 years, with equal weights to all years. In our 
model this comes down to GA > 0, GI = 0 and F = F = F =  9. The other four target values are the 
relative wages of young and middle aged workers of low and medium ability in the US. Although in 
practice a whole system of simultaneous equations is solved in which each target value is important for 
each parameter to be calibrated, it may be useful for our exposition here to bring some more structure. 
Certain parameters are clearly more than others linked to certain target values. The leisure parameters, 
including the elasticity of substitution in the composite leisure function (4), are basically determined 
such that with observed average levels of the policy variables (tax rates, non-employment benefit 
replacement rates, pension replacement rates, etc.) and the observed level of schooling quality (q)
10
  in 
Belgium, the model correctly predicts Belgium’s employment rates by age (, , ) and effective early 
retirement age (/). We find that the taste for leisure rises with age (γ = 0.070, γ = 0.126, γ =0.170) and observe a stronger degree of substitutability than in the Cobb-Douglas case between the two 
types of leisure for older workers (7 = 1.54). The human capital inheritance parameter is basically 
determined to match average per capita growth. We find an inheritance rate for the highest ability group 
of 85% (π = 0.85). Taking into account the values for εN and ε5, we obtain inheritance rates for the 
medium ability and the low ability groups of about 71% (=0.85x0.837) and 57% (=0.85x0.673). As we 
have explained in the beginning of Section 3.2., we rely on PISA science scores to obtain εN and ε5 . 
 
Calibration of the share parameters N and 5 is mainly driven by the values for relative wages of young 
workers in the US. As shown by Equation (26), these share parameters are important determinants of 
the relative productivity of labour. Actual wages are informative if a close link can be assumed between 
wages and productivity. This condition is much more likely fulfilled in the US, which explains the 
introduction here of US relative wages rather than those in Belgium (or in any other European country). 
We illustrate the key elements in our procedure to obtain values for 5 and N from these relative wage 
data in Appendix 2. The results imply 5 = 0.23, N = 0.30 and M = 0.47. A similar procedure is 
applied to derive values for
 {5 , {N and {M. These are basically determined such that the model correctly 
predicts relative wages of middle aged workers in the US, as well the target value for the education rate  (see also Appendix 2). We obtain φ5 = 2.83,φN = 4.66 and φM = 5.34. 
 
                                                          
9
 Only individuals with labor income below about 75% of the mean receive an additional social assistance benefit. 
We include this as ‘basic pension’ for the low ability individuals (GI5 > 0, see Table 5, and our discussion there). 
10
 And with the values of three parameters in the human capital production function (σ, z, κ) that we discuss below 
(see also footnote 11). 
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Finally, we had no strong ex ante indication on three parameters in the human capital production 
function: the scale parameter σ, the share parameter z and the elasticity of substitution parameter κ. 
We could assign sensible values to these parameters thanks to a sensitivity analysis on the results that 
we report in the next section. There we evaluate the capacity of our model to explain the facts in 13 
OECD countries that we reported in Table 1. Our guideline to pin down specific values for σ, z and κ was 
to minimize the deviation of our model’s predictions from the true data
11
.
 
This
 
procedure implied 
σ = 0.60, z = 0.125 and κ = 0.375. We observe decreasing returns in human capital growth. The result 
for κ reveals a higher degree of complementarity between private education time and government 
expenditures than in the Cobb-Douglas case. The result for v demonstrates relatively high importance for 
human capital formation of private education time versus productive public expenditures. Neither did 
we have an ex ante indication on the remaining parameters in the composite leisure function in Equation 
(4). We impose equal weight for both leisure types (μ=0.5). The normalisation parameter , equals 2. The 
size of this parameter has no impact at all on our country predictions or simulation results. 
 
4.2. Fiscal policy, pensions and education quality 
Tables 3 and 4 describe key characteristics of fiscal policy in 1995-2001/2004. Our proxy for the tax rate 
on labor income concerns the total tax wedge, for which we report the marginal rate in %. The data 
cover personal income taxes, employee and employer social security contributions payable on wage 
earnings and payroll taxes. The OECD publishes these marginal tax data for eight family and income 
situations. Our data for 9A in Table 3 are the average of all these situations. Belgium, Germany, Italy, 
Sweden and Finland have marginal labor tax rates above 55% or even 60%. The US have marginal labor 
tax rates below 40%. Capital tax rates are effective marginal corporate tax rates reported by the Institute 
for Fiscal Studies (their EMTR, base case). Germany and Belgium have the highest rates. In contrast to 
labor (and consumption), capital is taxed relatively little in the Nordic countries. As to consumption 
taxes, we follow Dhont and Heylen (2009) in computing them as the ratio of government indirect tax 
receipts (net of subsidies paid) to total domestic demand net of indirect taxes and subsidies. Our 
simplifying assumption is that consumption tax rates correspond to aggregate indirect tax rates. The 
Nordic countries stand out with the highest consumption tax rates, the US with the lowest. The utter 
right column in Table 3 shows the average ratio of gross government debt to GDP in the period that we 
study. The data range from less than 50% in Norway and the UK to more than 100% in Belgium and Italy.  
 
 
 
                                                          
11
 From our model’s predictions and the true data for 13 countries we computed for each variable 
(, , , /, , R>°<®ℎ) the root mean squared error normalized to the mean. We minimized the average 
normalized RMSE over all six variables. More precisely, we adopted the following iterative procedure. We chose 
values for σ, z and κ and then calibrated the other ten parameters (although it should be mentioned that the 
values for σ, z and κ hardly affected the calibration results for &). Given the obtained values for the other 
parameters, we computed the average normalized RMSE over all six endogenous variables. We then checked 
whether changes in σ, z and κ, and a recalibration of the other parameters , could further reduce this statistic. We 
did this until no further reduction was possible.    
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Table 3 Fiscal policy: Tax rates and government debt 
 
tax rate on labor 
income  
(in %) 
consumption 
tax rate 
(%) 
tax rate on 
capital income 
(%) 
Public debt  
(% of GDP) 
   Proxy for : 
 9A  9:  τ=  /  
Austria 54.9 13.2 17.3 69.6 
Belgium  67.2 13.4 27.1 111.7 
France 52.9 17.1 21.7 68.9 
Germany 60.4 11.1 34.4 63.1 
Italy 55.2 14.7 14.9 122.1 
Netherlands 52.0 12.2 24.3 68.2 
Denmark 48.6 18.9 22.5 60.3 
Finland 56.2 15.2 17.2 54.1 
Norway 50.8 16.4 22.1 40.4 
Sweden 56.0 17.9 16.1 67.2 
UK 44.9 14.5 21.2 46.6 
US 37.4 7.2 23.6 61.9 
Canada 46.4 14.5 24.8 83.8 
    
 
Overall 
average 
52.5 14.3 22.1 70.6 
Notes: Labor tax rates are data for the total tax wedge, marginal rate (OECD, Taxing Wages). Data are for 2000-2004. Earlier data 
are not available. For details, see Appendix 1. Capital tax rates are effective marginal corporate tax rates (Institute for Fiscal 
Studies, their EMTR, base case; data are for 1995-2001, see also Devereux et al., 2002). Consumption tax rates are from Dhont 
and Heylen (2009). Data are for 1995-2001. 
 
Table 4 summarizes our data for the expenditure side of fiscal policy. A first variable is our proxy for the 
net non-employment benefit replacement rate B. Since in our model non-employment is a structural or 
equilibrium phenomenon, the data that we use concern net transfers received by structurally or long-
term unemployed people. They include social assistance, family benefits and housing benefits in the 60
th
 
month of benefit receipt. They also include unemployment insurance or unemployment assistance 
benefits if these benefits are still paid, i.e. if workers can be structurally unemployed for more than five 
years without losing benefit eligibility
12
. The data are expressed in percent of after-tax wages. In line with 
our approach to determine labor tax rates, we again compute the average of data reported by the OECD 
for a wide range of family and income cases to determine b (see Appendix 1). Overall, the euro area 
countries and the Nordic countries pay the highest net benefits on average. Transfers to structurally non-
employed people are by far the lowest in the US. A related variable is our proxy for the net early 
retirement benefit replacement rate ber. The data are again expressed in percent of after-tax final wages. 
To assess the generosity of early retirement we integrate the information available via b and data for the 
implicit tax rate on continued work in the early retirement route as provided by Duval (2003) and Brandt 
et al. (2005). For details, see Appendix 1. We observe a very generous early retirement regime in Belgium 
and Finland, whereas net early retirement benefits in Anglo-Saxon countries are much lower. 
                                                          
12
 In the period that we study, this is the case in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Finland, Ireland, and the UK. 
Workers cannot be structurally non-employed and still receive unemployment benefits in the Netherlands, Italy, 
Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Spain, Portugal, Switzerland and the US (OECD, 2004, 
www.oecd.org/els/social/workincentives, Benefits and Wages, country specific files).  
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Table 4 Fiscal policy: net benefit replacement rates, consumption, productive expenditures  
 
 Non-
employment 
benefit (net 
replacement 
rate, %) 
Early 
retirement 
benefits (net 
replacement 
rate, %) 
government 
consumption  
 (% of GDP) 
 
government 
productive 
expenditures 
 (% of GDP) 
Proxy for : 
 B  BDE   R:    RS 
 
  
    
Austria 56.3 71.6  14.6  9.1 
Belgium 59.6 79.0  16.9  8.9 
France 46.0 63.8  18.3  11.0 
Germany 64.7 70.8  15.3  8.6 
Italy 17.0 55.7  14.3  8.0 
Netherlands 55.0 68.1  18.4  10.3 
Denmark 61.9 43.2  18.4  12.5 
Finland 61.3 73.8  16.0  11.4 
Norway 56.9 39.9  14.7  12.1 
Sweden 55.4 39.0  20.0  14.0 
UK 51.1 39.4  14.4  7.3 
US 30.5 18.3  10.3  9.3 
Canada 44.4 27.0  14.7  9.3  
Overall 
average 
52.2 53.8  15.9  10.1  
Notes: A description of all variables is given in the main text. For more details, see Appendix 1. The data for net benefit 
replacement rates are an average for 2001-2004 (earlier data are not available). The data for government consumption and 
productive expenditures concern 1995-2001.  
 
Our data for productive government expenditures (RS) in Table 4 include education, active labor market 
expenditures, government financed R&D and public investment, in percent of GDP. On average, 
education expenditures constitute close to 60% of total RS. Governments in the Nordic countries 
allocate by far the highest fractions of output to productive expenditures. Productive expenditures in 
percent of GDP are the lowest in the UK. The US and most core countries of the euro area take 
intermediate positions. Government consumption in percent of GDP is the highest also in the Nordic 
countries, followed at close distance by several countries of the core euro area
13
. In the US, government 
consumption is (much) lower.  
 
Table 5 contains our data for the net pension replacement rates GAand GI. The data have been taken 
or computed from OECD (2005). They include only (quasi-)mandatory pension programs
14
. In line with 
our specification in Equation (9), GA is expressed as a percentage of an individual’s average lifetime net 
labor income, while GI is expressed as a percentage of average economy-wide net labor income at the 
                                                          
13
 Like Dhont and Heylen (2009) we calculate our data for government consumption as total government 
consumption in % of GDP, diminished with the fraction of public education outlays going to wages and working-
expenses. We include the latter in productive expenditures.  
14
 In most countries mandatory programs are public. For Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden the data also 
include benefits from mandatory private systems. These benefits are earnings-related and included under GA. 
Voluntary, occupational pensions are not included in our data. 
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time of retirement. We consider individuals at 50 percent of mean earnings as representative for the low 
ability group, individuals with mean earnings as representative for the medium ability group, and 
individuals at twice the mean earnings as representative for the high ability group. Appendix 1 gives 
more details on the construction of the data. In the majority of countries individuals with mean or higher 
earnings only receive earnings-related pensions (GA > 0, GI = 0 for 
 = , ). Among these 
countries, Austria and Italy pay the highest net replacement rates (GAN>85%), Belgium and the US the 
lowest (GAN< 65%)15. Five countries also pay basic pensions to individuals with mean or higher earnings: 
the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, the UK and Canada. For individuals with low earnings, the situation 
is somewhat the opposite. Their pension includes a significant basic (or similar) component in most 
countries. Unsurprisingly, the Netherlands, Denmark and the UK pay the highest ‘basic’ amounts
16
.   
 
We emphasize that the straightforward way in which the OECD computes the pension replacement 
rates, in percent of an individual’s average lifetime labor income, comes down to assuming in our model 
that the weights F, F and F are all equal to 1/3. For reasons of consistency we will therefore make this 
assumption for all individual countries when we derive our model’s predictions. We are aware, however, 
that equal weights do not fully match practice in all countries. Some deviate from this prototype, to 
varying degrees
17
. When we compare our model’s predictions for these countries to the facts in the next 
section, we should take this into account. Assuming equal weights may slightly bias our predictions. 
 
A final variable in Table 5 is our indicator for education quality (T) in the human capital production 
function (12, 18). For each country we use PISA science scores. We concentrate on test results for 
science given their expected closer link to growth (Barro, 2001). The mean score is best in Finland, 
followed by the Netherlands, Canada and the UK. Education quality is relatively low in Italy, Denmark, 
Norway and the US. Note that there is no correlation between productive government expenditures in 
Table 4 and the PISA scores in Table 5. The coefficient of correlation is -0.04. There is no correlation 
either if we restrict productive expenditures to education only. Both variables seem to tell different 
stories (see also Woessmann, 2003). 
 
 
 
                                                          
15
 Next to the pension level, differences exist also in the precise organization of the earnings-related system. Some 
countries have pure defined-benefit systems (e.g. Belgium, Finland, US), others have so-called point systems 
(Germany) or notional-account systems (Italy, Sweden).
 
Although these three systems can appear very different, 
OECD (2005) shows that they are all similar variants of earnings-related pension schemes. 
16
 As we explain in Appendix 1, it should be mentioned that our proxy for GI also includes targeted and minimum 
pensions. Basic pensions pay the same amount to every retiree. Targeted plans pay a higher benefit to poorer 
pensioners and reduced benefits to better-off ones. Minimum pensions are similar to targeted plans. Their main 
aim is to prevent pensions from falling below a certain level (OECD, 2005, p. 22-23). Our main motivation to merge 
these three categories in our proxy for GI  is that they are not (or even inversely) linked to earnings. 
17
 In Austria, Norway and France earnings-related pensions are not calculated from average lifetime income but 
from average income during the final working years or a number of years with the highest earnings. Ideally, one 
would impose different weights p1, p2 and p3. However, the pension replacement rate reported by the OECD would 
then no longer be reliable since it is based on the assumption of equal weights. 
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Table 5 Net pension replacement rates and PISA education score  
 
Net earnings-related pension 
replacement rate (% average 
earned net labor income) 
Net basic pension replacement 
rate (% economy-wide average 
net labor income) 
PISA science 
score (divided 
by 1000) 
Proxy for : Low Medium High Low Medium High  
 GA5  GAN  GAM  GI5  GIN  GIM  T 
        
Austria 88.7 88.9 75.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.507 
Belgium 55.4 63.1 42.7 17.2 0.0 0.0 0.505 
France 62.9 68.8 59.2 23.2 0.0 0.0 0.502 
Germany 60.4 71.8 67.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.502 
Italy 89.3 88.8 89.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.480 
Netherlands 0.0 42.1 62.9 46.4 42.1 36.2 0.525 
Denmark 15.3 11.0 10.0 43.6 43.1 42.2 0.484 
Finland 82.3 78.8 78.3 4.9 0.0 0.0 0.550 
Norway 36.4 43.0 38.4 26.4 22.1 20.3 0.490 
Sweden 64.6 65.9 74.3 13.6 2.3 0.0 0.507 
UK 0.0 5.0 8.0 43.6 42.6 41.2 0.523 
US 61.4 51.0 39.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.493 
Canada 31.6 33.9 18.1 31.5 23.2 23.3 0.527 
        
Overall average 49.9 54.8 51.0 19.3 13.0 12.6 0.507 
   Notes: Pension replacement rates have been taken or computed from OECD (2005, p. 52 and part II). The data concern 2002. 
   For more details, see Appendix 1. The PISA science scores are an average for 2000, 2003 and 2006. 
 
 
4.3 Predicted versus actual employment by age, education of the young, and growth in the OECD  
 
Can our model match the facts that we have reported in Table 1? In this section we confront our model’s 
predictions with the true data for 1995-2007. Clearly, one should be aware of the serious limitations of 
such an exercise. First of all, our model is highly stylized and may (obviously) miss potential determinants 
of growth or employment. Second, even if we compute the true data in Table 1 as averages over a longer 
period, these averages need not be equal to the steady state. Countries may still be moving towards 
their steady state. Third, this exercise only concerns the last 15 years. Due to lack of data – especially 
with respect to marginal labor tax rates and non-employment benefits before the mid 1990s – it is 
impossible for us to relate changes in growth and employment to changes in policy within countries over 
longer time periods. In spite of all this, if one considers the extreme variation in the predictions of 
existing calibrated models investigating the effects of fiscal policy in the literature (see Stokey and 
Rebelo, 1995), even a minimal test of the ‘goodness of fit’ of our model is informative. This information 
is important to assess the value of the simulations that we present in the next section, and their reliability 
for policy analysis. In most papers in the literature a test of the external validity of the model is missing.   
 
Our calibration implies that our model’s prediction matches the employment rates by age, the effective 
retirement age of older workers, education, and per capita growth in Belgium. The test of the model’s 
validity is whether it can also match the data for the other countries, and cross-country differences. 
Before one uses a model for policy analysis, one would like to see for example that the model does not 
overestimate, nor underestimate the performance differences related to observed cross-country policy 
differences. Our test is tough since we impose the same preference and technology parameters, 
25 
 
reported in the upper part of Table 2, on all countries. Only fiscal policy variables, the pension 
replacement rate, and education quality differ. Moreover, assuming perfect competition, we disregard 
differences in labor and product market institutions which some authors consider of crucial importance 
(e.g. Nickell et al., 2005). Still, we find that the model matches the facts remarkably well for a large 
majority of countries. Basically, we here confirm earlier findings by e.g. Ohanian et al. (2008) and Dhont 
and Heylen (2008) that once one controls for fiscal policy differences, variation in taste for leisure or 
different market rigidities are not critical to explain cross-country variation in labor market performance. 
As a part of fiscal policy, lump sum transfers also differ across countries. Underlying our model’s 
predictions for each country, is the assumption of a constant debt to GDP ratio at the level reported for 
that country in Table 3. Lump sum transfers adjust endogenously in Equation (28) to obtain this 
equilibrium debt to GDP ratio. 
 
Figures 2 to 4 relate our model’s predictions to actual observations for three employment rates by age 
(aggregated over the three ability groups). We add the 45°-line to assess the absolute differences 
between predictions and facts, as well as the coefficient of correlation between predictions and facts. 
Our model performs quite well. In each age group, it correctly predicts high employment rates in the US 
and Canada and low employment in Germany. For young workers it also correctly predicts relatively low 
employment in most other countries of the core euro area, and in the Nordic countries. For older 
workers it has relatively high employment right in the Nordic countries and the UK. Overall correlation 
between the model’s predictions and the actual data in Figure 2 is 0.35. If we drop Italy, for which there 
are good reasons
18
, this rises to 0.69. Correlation in Figure 3 is 0.48, in Figure 4 it is 0.76. Moreover, in 
each figure - again after dropping Italy from Figure 2 - the regression line (not shown) is close to the 45°-
line, which suggests that our model correctly assesses the size of the employment effects of policy 
differences across countries. Next to Italy, there are a few other countries, where our model somewhat 
over- or underpredicts. The model’s employment predictions tend to be too high for France and the 
Netherlands. They are too low in Figures 2 and 3 for Denmark and Finland.  
 
Figure 5 relates our model’s predictions to the facts for the effective retirement age. The model again 
captures the large differences between countries. It predicts the highest retirement age in the Anglo-
Saxon and Nordic countries and a much lower retirement age in core euro area countries. Correlation 
between actual data and the model’s predictions is 0.91. In Figures 6 and 7 we relate our model’s 
predictions to the facts for education and growth. For education, the model correctly captures key 
differences between the Nordic countries on the one hand and countries like the UK and Italy on the 
other. Predictions for education are quite close to the 45°-line for all individual countries except 
Germany and (especially) Denmark and Finland. The model does not match the high participation in 
education in the latter two countries. Finally, our model has important cross-country differences right for 
growth. The model has some difficulty however to explain observed growth for the UK and Canada. 
Correlation between the model’s predictions and the true data is 0.76 for education and 0.69 for growth. 
                                                          
18
 A major element behind the deviation for this country seems to be underestimation of the fallback income 
position for structurally non-employed young workers. OECD data show very low replacement rates in Italy. 
However, as shown by Reyneri (1994), the gap between Italy and other European countries is much smaller than it 
seems when family support as an alternative to unemployment benefits is taken into account. Fernández Cordón 
(2001) shows that in Italy young people live much longer with their parents than in other countries.   
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Figure 2. Employment rate in hours of young individuals in 13 countries, in %, 1995-2007 
 
  Note: The dotted line is the 45°-line. Correlation between actual data and the model’s predictions is 0.35. 
  Excluding Italy correlation rises to 0.69.  
 
 
Figure 3. Employment rate in hours of middle aged individuals in 13 countries, in %, 1995-2007 
  
 Note: The dotted line is the 45°-line. Correlation between actual data and the model’s predictions is 0.48.  
 
 
Figure 4. Employment rate in hours of older individuals in individual countries, in %, 1995-2007 
 
 Note: The dotted line is the 45°-line. Correlation between actual data and the model’s predictions is 0.76.  
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Figure 5. Effective retirement age, 1995-2006 
 
 Note: The dotted line is the 45°-line. Correlation between actual data and the model’s predictions is 0.91.  
 
 
Figure 6. Tertiary education rate in individual countries, in %, 1995-2006  
 
  Note: The dotted line is the 45°-line. Correlation between actual data and the model’s predictions is 0.76.  
 
 
Figure 7. Annual per capita potential GDP growth in 13 countries, in %, 1995-2007 
 
 
    Note: The dotted line is the 45°-line. Correlation between actual data and the model’s predictions is 0.69. 
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5. Public pension reform 
 
Having established the empirical relevance of our model, we now simulate a series of policy shocks. Our 
aim is to discover the (relative) effectiveness of various reforms of the pension system for the 
employment rate of three age and three ability groups, aggregate employment, education of the young,  
growth, and income at old-age (especially for the low-ability group). We report steady state effects, and 
welfare effects per generation and per ability group. We also show the pension level of low-ability 
retirees. Throughout all our policy simulations we assume that the government maintains a constant 
debt to GDP ratio in each period. To reach this goal, it adjusts the consumption tax rate. Alternative 
simulations where the government adjusts lump sum transfers yield the same conclusions as the ones 
we report below. For a proper understanding of timing, it will be our assumption that the economy is in 
steady state at time t=-1. Reform is announced at time t=0 and implemented with a delay of 1 period, i.e. 
at time t=1. Hence, reforms apply to everyone except the generation of retirees at t=0, since they are no 
longer able to adapt their behavior
19
. 
Table 6 shows the steady state effects of seven (permanent) reforms in key features of the pension 
system. The benchmark from which we start, and against which all policy shocks are evaluated, is the 
average of the six core euro area countries in our sample. The parameters describing the benchmark 
pension system are indicated in the upper left corner of the table and in a first note below the table. 
Individual earnings-related replacement rates vary in the benchmark between 59% (GA5) and 71% (GAN). 
They are applied to a pension base where each active period has equal weight (F=1/3). Basic pensions 
take values between 6% (GIM) and 15% (GI5) of aggregate average net labor income. No particular 
minimum level is imposed to the pension (MP=0). The percentage point change in the consumption tax 
rate to maintain a constant debt to GDP ratio is indicated at the bottom of the table. 
                  
Figure 8 shows the welfare effects of these policy changes for high and for low-ability individuals of 
current and future generations. The results for medium-ability individuals are in general quite close to 
those for the high-ability group. We report on the vertical axis the welfare effect on individuals of the 
generation born k periods after the announcement of the policy reform, where k is indicated on the 
horizontal axis. So, the data at k=0 for example concern the young in the period of the policy 
announcement. The data at k=-3 concern the retirees in that period
20
. Our welfare measure is the 
(constant) percentage change in benchmark consumption in each period of remaining life that 
individuals should get to attain the same lifetime utility as after the policy shock (see also King and 
Rebelo, 1990). To compute this percentage change we keep employment rates at the benchmark. For 
example, policy 1 implies a welfare gain for the current high-ability young (k=0) equal to 1% of 
benchmark consumption. It implies a welfare loss for the current older low-ability individuals (k=-2) 
equal to 2% of their benchmark consumption.  
                                                          
19
 Current retirees will therefore not experience a change in their pension replacement rate(s), nor in the rules 
behind the computation of their pension assessment base. Their disposable income can change, however, when 
the government adjusts consumption taxes to keep the ratio of public debt to GDP constant, or when the aggregate 
average net wage (to which the basic pension replacement rate GI  applies) changes. 
20
 Consistent with footnote 19, these retirees are only indirectly affected by the policy change. 
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In Table 7 we integrate the welfare effects induced by each policy reform into a single aggregate 
summary measure. For each individual we first compute the present discounted value of the total 
consumption change over life that is required in the benchmark to make him equally well-off as under 
the policy reform. The basis of our computation are the data that we report in Figure 8. But now we also 
take into account differences in the length of remaining life. For young individuals the data in Figure 8 
apply to four periods, whereas for retired individuals they only apply to one remaining period. Next, we 
impose that all those who lose under the new policy are compensated by the winners. Our summary 
measure is the present discounted value of the net aggregate consumption gain of all winners after 
having compensated the losers, in percent of initial GDP. The first row in Table 7 includes all current and 
four future generations of all three ability types into the computation. The second row includes only 
those generations that live at the moment the reform is announced. 
 
Given its importance for welfare at old-age, and the risk of old-age poverty, we focus in Figure 9 on the 
evolution of the pension level of low-ability retirees in the periods after a policy reform. Reported data at 
time t=0 concern the pension level of those who are retired at the moment of announcement of the new 
policy and who are only indirectly affected by it. Data at t=3 concern the pension level of those who are 
young at the time of announcement. All data are expressed relative to the benchmark. 
 
The starting point of our discussion is policy 1, which introduces for all individuals an increase in F, and 
a fall in F, along the lines preferred by Buyse et al. (2011). To compute the pension base, the weight of 
labor income earned as an older worker rises to 2/3, the weight of labor income earned when young falls 
to 0. Our results confirm the important positive effects of such a reform for aggregate employment and 
growth. The higher (lower) marginal utility from work when older (young) makes it interesting to shift 
work from the first period of active life to the third, and to postpone effective retirement ( and / rise,  falls). The positive effect that we observe on / and  is fully in line with earlier arguments by 
Sheshinski (1978) and Gruber and Wise (2002), among others. Jaag et al. (2010) also predict a shift from  to  when F falls and F rises. Unlike in Jaag et al., however, the role of endogenous education in 
our model strongly qualifies the fall in young workers’ labor supply. As is clear in Table 6, young 
individuals are encouraged to study (e increases) because the lifetime rate of return to building human 
capital rises. This follows first from the reduction of the opportunity cost of studying when young, 
second from the perspective of working longer, and third from the greater importance of effective 
human capital when old in the pension calculation. Extra schooling contributes to steady-state growth 
and reinforces incentives to work at older age. We observe an increase in the annual growth rate by 
0.08 %-points. Note also that the employment rate rises in each ability group (M, N , 5), but most so 
among low-ability individuals (Δ5=1.43). These individuals can only respond to the new policy by 
working longer, they cannot study and enjoy higher human capital. Interestingly, the government budget 
does not deteriorate. It becomes possible to cut the consumption tax rate while keeping the ratio of 
public debt to GDP constant (see bottom of Table 6).  
 
A quick comparison with the other policies in Table 6, to be discussed immediately, reveals that most of 
them are less effective than policy 1 when it comes to promoting (aggregate) employment and growth. 
Table 7 also reveals significant net aggregate welfare gains. The main disadvantage of policy 1, however, 
is the welfare loss that it imposes on the current older and middle aged generations of low-ability 
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individuals (Figure 8, upper panel, RHS). These individuals work more, but can hardly consume more. 
Even if policy 1 offers a convincing solution to the overall challenge of employment and growth in 
today’s economies, and even if it may contribute to safeguard the welfare state in the future, it may also 
worsen conditions for a significant part of the lower ability individuals. Moreover, it may offer no 
solution to the problem of old-age poverty faced by many. Figure 9 shows an important fall relative to 
the benchmark in the pension level of many generations of low-ability individuals to come. These 
observations make it politically difficult to impose such a policy. 
  
 
Table 6. Steady state effects of pension reform – Effects for a benchmark of 6 core euro area countries  
 (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands). 
 
Initial values: F=1/3 F=1/3 F=1/3 =0 
Policy 1 F=0 F=1/3 F=2/3 
Policy 2 =0.6 Policy 3 GA=0 GI=0.75 
 
 
Policy 4 F=0 F=1/3 F=2/3  =0.6 
Policy 5 F=0 F=1/3 F=2/3 GA5=0.85 
Policy 6 FNM=0 FNM=1/3 FNM=2/3 GA5=0.85 
Policy 7 
Fully 
Funded 
Effect 
(a)
:        Δ  -3.41 -0.51 -1.06 -3.33 -3.56 -2.84 0.04 Δ  0.12 -1.00 -3.02 -0.92 0.36 0.29 -1.47 Δ  7.02 -3.48 -10.4 1.15 8.24 5.99 -7.80 Δ/ (c) 0.85 -0.47 -1.41 0.09 1.00 0.80 -1.15 Δe  1.37 0.00 -0.46 1.37 1.37 1.41 -0.36 
        Δ (a. b) 0.92 -1.55 -4.50 -1.14 1.31 0.88 -2.79 Δ²/² (d) 1.66 -2.81 -8.14 -2.06 2.37 1.62 -5.05 
ΔM  0.60 0.01 -3.88 0.61 0.59 0.60 -2.84 ΔN  0.72 0.01 -4.66 0.73 0.72 0.72 -2.98 Δ5  1.43 -4.68 -4.96 -4.75 2.61 1.10 -2.55 
∆ annual 
growth 
rate
(b)
 
0.08 0.00 -0.03 0.08 0.08 0.08 -0.02 
∆9:  (e) -1.19 1.66 5.07 1.15 -0.38 0.13 7.50 
 
        Notes: Initial values: GA5=59.4, GAN=70.6, GAM=66.1, GI5=14.6, GIN=7.0, GIM=6.0. 
    (a) difference in percentage points between new steady state and benchmark. except ∆²/² and /. 
 (b) change in (weighted) aggregate employment rate in hours, change in percentage points. 
    (c) change in optimal effective retirement age in years 
 (d) change in volume of employment in hours, in percent.  
 (e) change in consumption tax rate in percentage points to keep the ratio of debt to GDP constant. 
 
Policies 2 and 3 focus on the problem of low pensions for low-ability individuals. Policy 2 maintains all 
benchmark replacement rates, but also introduces a minimum pension. Individuals are sure of a pension 
equal to at least 60% of average net labor income per worker in the economy. In practice the latter 
implies a strong increase in the pension level for the low-ability group (see also Figure 9), but no ex-ante 
change for the other two groups. Their optimal behavior given all policy variables implies a pension that 
is above 60% of the average net wage from the beginning. We remind that none of the policy reforms 
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that we discuss apply to the retired at the moment of the announcement of the reform, so they are not 
eligible to the minimum pension. As shown by Figure 8, all low-ability individuals except the retired (k=-3) 
experience welfare increases up to about 4% under policy 2. For the welfare of all other individuals, 
however, these policies have very negative effects. A key element is the drastic drop in the employment 
rate among low-ability individuals. The perspective of a minimum pension introduces a strong 
disincentive for them to work (see also Sommacal, 2006). The implied fall in aggregate employment and 
its negative effects on the government’s budget, force the latter to raise consumption tax rates for all. 
Furthermore, medium and higher ability individuals can also expect a fall in their wage per unit of 
effective labor due to the reduction of low-ability labor supply
21
.  
 
Policy 3 imposes a shift from own-earnings related pensions to ‘basic’ pensions on all individuals. Every 
retiree gets a basic pension equal to 75% of average net labor income per worker in the economy. In our 
model GA goes to zero for all ability groups, GI becomes 0.75. This policy basically goes one step further 
than policy 2. It breaks the relationship between the pension and an individual’s human capital and labor 
supply also for the high and medium-ability groups. The fall in the return to studying and to working also 
for these groups is at the basis of an overall and strong fall in employment, education time and growth. 
Figure 8 reveals negative welfare effects almost across the board, especially for higher ability individuals 
and all future generations. Only current older low-ability individuals gain. They benefit most from higher 
pensions. Due to lower growth, this gain will not persist for the future low-ability generations however. 
As a result, policy 3 shows among the worst net aggregate welfare effects in Table 7.  
 
Policies 4, 5 and 6 search for ways to combine the efficiency of policy 1 with the objective to reduce the 
risk of old-age poverty for low-ability individuals. Policy 4 extends policy 1 with a minimum pension equal 
to 60% of the average net wage, like in policy 2. This policy is most beneficial for the welfare of all low-
ability individuals (except the retired). They enjoy both an immediate increase in their pension, for which 
they have to work less, and the benefits from increased human capital formation by the high and 
medium-ability groups. The latter immediately contributes to higher wages per person, also for the 
lower ability individuals, and to increased levels of inherited human capital for all future generations. 
Like policy 2, however, policy 4 also imposes significant welfare losses on the current generations of high 
and medium-ability individuals, which drastically reduces its chances politically. Net aggregate effects in 
Table 7 are still negative. 
  
Policy 5 tackles the problem of low income at old-age for the low-ability group by significantly raising 
their individual earnings-related pension replacement rate to 85% (ΔGA5  = 25.6%-points). This policy 
combines the efficiency gains from policy 1 with strong incentives for the low-ability group to work more 
and longer. In contrast to the disincentives induced by basic or minimum pensions, policy 5 raises the 
return to work since it yields more future pension. Among all the policies that we discuss in Table 6, not 
one has more favorable effects on aggregate employment (Δ=1.31) or on the employment rate of low-
ability individuals (Δ5=2.61). Higher pensions can as a result be paid without the need for the 
government to raise consumption taxes. Given the strong rise in output and employment, τc can even be 
                                                          
21
 As a narrow alternative to policy 2, we also investigated the introduction of a minimum pension combined with 
an abolishment of all basic pensions. All effects were very similar. Only the required increase in the consumption 
tax rate was smaller, since the government could save money from GI going to 0.   
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reduced. Compared to policy 1, welfare effects for the low-ability group are better, without hurting the 
medium and high-ability groups. Policy 5 induces the best net aggregate welfare effects in Table 7. 
 
Figure 8. Welfare effects for individuals belonging to current and future generations after pension reform 
 
                                                  High ability                                                    Low ability 
               
 
 
Note:  The vertical axis indicates the welfare effect for individuals belonging to the generation born k periods  
            after the announcement of permanent pension reform. The horizontal axis indicates k. Negative numbers 
 for k point at generations born before the reform. 
 
 
Table 7. Net welfare effect after compensating welfare transfers (expressed as % of initial GDP) 
 
Included generations  Policy 1 Policy 2 Policy 3 Policy 4 Policy 5 Policy 6 Policy 7 
All current + 4 future 1.8 -1.6 -6.1 -0.2 1.9 1.8 -2.8 
All current 0.6 -1.3 -4.2 -0.8 1.0 0.9 -4.5 
Note: for a description of the computation of these data, see main text. 
 
Policy 6 reconsiders the basic choice made in policy 1 to raise the weight of labor income earned as an 
older worker in the computation of the pension assessment base, and to reduce the weight of labor 
income earned as a young worker. One of the main advantages of this choice is that it promotes 
education and human capital formation. Given that low-ability individuals will never continue education 
at the tertiary level, however, one may question this change in weights for them. Policy 6 therefore 
maintains the much higher individual earnings-related replacement rate for the low-ability group 
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(GA5=85%), but combines this with equal weights F=1/3 for this group. The shift to F=0, F=1/3 and F=2/3 only applies to medium and high-ability individuals. Employment and growth effects from policy 
6 are better than, or at least as good as, those from policy 1. For the low-ability individuals, who work 
the highest fraction of their time while they are young, maintaining F at 1/3 in policy 6 implies a further 
increase in their pension benefit compared to policy 5. This further increase in pensions will force the 
government to slightly raise the consumption tax rate. All in all, however, the welfare effects from policy 
6 are among the best for the low-ability individuals, with quasi no cost imposed on the others. Net 
aggregate welfare effects from policy 6 are in between those from policies 1 and  5.  
 
Figure 9. Pension level (relative to benchmark) of low-ability retirees at time t (where t=0 is when the  
                 policy reform is announced and t=1 is when it is implemented) 
 
 
Note: Policy 7 is not included. This policy implies a gradual reduction of public pensions to zero. 
 
Policy 7 is a gradual shift from the PAYG system in the benchmark to a system with full private capital 
funding. This policy completely abolishes old-age pension benefits (GA , GI). For the government it 
implies a drastic cut in pension expenditures. We assume that this drop in expenditures feeds through 
into lower social security contributions for all workers such that, ex ante, the decline in total labor tax 
receipts in % of GDP is exactly the same as the drop in pension expenditures.
22
 We observe in Table 6 
that this transition to a private fully-funded pension scheme is not beneficial for employment. The new 
steady state shows lower hours worked among all ability groups and all age groups. The fall in 
employment is the strongest among older workers. The aggregate employment rate n drops by about 
2.8%-points. An important element here is that a fully-funded system breaks the direct positive link 
between individual labor income and the pension, which exists in the PAYG system as we have modeled 
                                                          
22
 In particular, the gradual decline in GA and GI is announced at time t=0 and implemented as follows. Pension 
benefits are not reduced for retirees at the moment of policy announcement (t=0), since retirees are not able to 
react to a pension reduction. In t=1 and t=2 the replacement rates are respectively reduced to 2/3 and 1/3 of their 
initial rates. From t=3 onwards, GA and GI are zero. At each moment, overall labor tax rates are reduced to ex 
ante compensate for the decline in pension expenditures. 
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it. Steady state time allocated to education also falls, slightly. So does growth (-0.02%-points). 
Furthermore, we observe that a shift to a fully-funded system affects the government balance negatively 
(as the consumption tax rate has to be increased by more than 7 percentage points). The latter is mainly 
due to the decline in the tax base as hours of work decrease. Another element is that, although we also 
find that moving to a system with private capital funding encourages national savings (see e.g. Feldstein, 
1974, 2005), this need not imply an increase in domestic physical capital formation, and capital taxes. If 
effective labor supply and employment fall, so will the marginal product of physical capital, which causes 
savings to be invested abroad. Figure 8 reveals a strong intertemporal trade-off in the welfare effects 
from moving to a fully-funded system. Future generations gain, but current, transitional generations 
experience large welfare losses
23
. This result is well-known in the literature. Although the future gains in 
Figure 8 are relatively strong when compared to those from e.g. policy 6, it should also be recognized 
that in the more distant future (k>5) a fully-funded system will bring less gains. A key element is that it 
lacks the incentives to promote human capital formation and growth inherent in policies 1, 5 and 6.  
 
The possibility that a fully-funded pension system has lower growth than a PAYG model has been shown 
before by Kemnitz and Wigger (2000), Zhang and Zhang (2003), and Kaganovich and Meier (2008). The 
endogeneity of education and human capital is crucial for that result also in their models. The inferior 
employment effects from a shift to a fully-funded system may, however, be surprising from the 
perspective of recent work by e.g. Börsch-Supan and Ludwig (2010), Ludwig et al. (2012) and Fisher and 
Keuschnigg (2010). For a discussion of this issue we refer to Buyse et al. (2011). A major element is that 
the existing literature generally compares a fully-funded system with a specific PAYG system which is less 
‘intelligent’ than in our policies 5 or 6. Either one assumes for example a ‘flat’ PAYG system where 
individuals’ pensions do not depend on their own human capital and labor earnings (as in our policy 3), 
or one models the public old-age pension system as an immediate alternative to work, neglecting the 
reality of early retirement systems.  
 
6. Conclusions 
        
We study the effects of pension reform in a four-period OLG model for an open economy where hours 
worked by three active generations, education of the young, the retirement decision of older workers, 
and aggregate growth, are all endogenous. Within each generation we distinguish individuals with high, 
medium or low ability to build human capital, which allows to investigate also the effects of pension 
reform on the income and welfare levels of different ability groups. Our specification of pension benefits 
allows for both own-earnings related and flat-rate or basic components. The weight of each component 
may differ for individuals with different abilities. Next to the pension system, we introduce a role for 
                                                          
23
 The explanation for the welfare loss of current generations in our model is as follows. The announcement of the 
transition to a fully-funded system, and the perspective of a gradual fall in labor taxes during periods 1,2 and 3, as 
described in footnote 22, makes individuals shift hours worked to the future. During transition the young will study 
more, but total effective labor falls. Since this reduces the marginal productivity of physical capital, it will also 
discourage investment. Capital flows out. The economy experiences a strong drop in aggregate output (and tax 
revenue), which will force the government to raise consumption taxes. In later periods the economy enjoys the 
benefits from having accumulated more human capital during transition, but increased education efforts are not 
permanent (on the contrary). 
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education quality as well as a rich fiscal policy block. The government sets tax rates on labor, capital and 
consumption. It allocates its revenue to productive expenditures (mainly for education), consumption, 
non-employment benefits (including early retirement benefits) and pensions.  
We check the validity of our model and our calibration by simulating the model for 13 OECD countries 
and comparing its results with the true data. Imposing common technology and preference parameters 
but country-specific policy parameters, we find that the predictions of our model match the main facts 
remarkably well.  
 
Simulating various models of pension reform, we find that an ‘intelligent’ PAYG system may have 
positive effects on both employment, the effective retirement age, education, aggregate growth and 
welfare. These positive effects are the strongest when the PAYG system includes a tight link between 
individual labor income (and contributions) and the pension, and when it attaches a high weight to labor 
income earned as an older worker to compute the pension assessment base. Such a system stimulates 
individuals’ labor supply when they are middle aged and older, and education when they are young. 
Positive effects on human capital formation promote future productivity and earnings capacity, also for 
future generations. An ‘intelligent’ PAYG system may perform (much) better than a system with a strong 
basic pension component, or a system with full private funding.   
 
Recognizing realistic differences across people in ability to learn and to build human capital, however, we 
find that this ‘intelligent’ PAYG system implies significant welfare losses for current generations of low-
ability individuals, who cannot study and who work at low wages. We therefore study various 
alternatives to maintain the aggregate efficiency gains of an ‘intelligent’ PAYG system, while at the same 
time contributing to higher income at old-age and welfare for all individuals. Most promising is to 
maintain the tight link between individual labor income and the pension also for low-ability individuals, 
but to strongly raise their replacement rate. Such a system performs much better economically, and may 
expect to receive much more support politically, than basic or minimum pension components to 
promote the income of low-ability individuals. A tight link between individual labor income and the 
pension, combined with a high replacement rate, is a very effective way to promote labor supply. Basic 
and minimum pension models by contrast have strong negative effects on labor supply of low-ability 
individuals. A second welfare increasing adjustment would be to maintain equal weights in the pension 
assessment base for low-ability individuals. Since these individuals cannot study at the tertiary level, it is 
not optimal to give a lower weight to the labor income they earn when young.  
 
Our findings tend to support recent pension reforms in countries like Sweden and Finland. Sweden 
moved from a quite non-actuarial PAYG system to a quasi-actuarial system with individual notional 
accounts (Lindbeck and Persson, 2003; OECD, 2005). These accounts establish a close relationship 
between working hours, labor earnings and contributions on the one hand, and future pensions on the 
other, as in the case of a high replacement rate GA in our model (and a low GI). Finland introduced a 
system where the pension accrual rate rises with age, which corresponds to the case of a rising pj as 
workers get older in our model (OECD, 2005). Our results support this policy, except for individuals with 
low capacity to study at the tertiary level.   
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Appendix 1: Construction of data and data sources 
 
In this appendix we provide more detail on the construction of some of our performance variables and 
policy variables.  
 
Employment rate in hours (in one of three age groups, 1995-2007) 
Definition: total actual hours worked by individuals in the age group / potential hours worked. 
Actual hours worked = total employment in persons x average hours worked per week x average number 
of weeks worked per year. 
Potential hours = total population in the age group x 2080 (where 2080 = 52 weeks per year x 40 hours 
per week) 
Data sources:  
* Total employment and total population in the age group: OECD Stat, Labour Force Statistics by Sex and 
Age. Data are available for many age groups, among which 20-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-49, 50-54, 55-64. We 
constructed the data for our three age groups as weighted averages. 
* Average hours worked per week: OECD Stat, Labour Force Statistics, Average usual weekly hours 
worked on the main job. These data are available only for age groups 15-24, 25-54, 55-64. We use the 
OECD data for the age group 15-24 as a proxy for our age subgroup 20-24, the OECD data for the age 
group 25-54 as a proxy for our age (sub)groups 25-34, 35-49 and 50-54. 
* Average number of weeks worked per year: Due to lack of further detail, we use the same data for 
each age group. The average number of weeks worked per year has been approximated by dividing 
average annual hours actually worked per worker (total employment) by average usual weekly hours 
worked on the main job by all workers (total employment). Data source: OECD Stat, Labour Force 
Statistics, Hours worked. 
 
Education rate of the young (age group 20-34, 1995-2006) 
Definition: total hours studied by individuals of age 20-34 / potential hours studied 
As a proxy we have computed the ratio: ( )20 34 20 24 25 34 20 340 5 0 25fts . pts . pts / pop− − − −+ +  
with:  fts the number of full-time students in the age group 20-34 
           pts the number of part-time students in the age groups 20-24 and 25-34. 
           pop total population of age 20-34 
Full-time students are assumed to spend all their time studying. For part-time students of age 20-24 we 
make the assumption (for all countries) that they spend 50% of their time studying, part-time students of 
age 25-34 are assumed to spend 25% of their time studying. Due to the limited number of part-time 
students, these specific weights matter very little.  
Data sources:  
* Full-time students in age groups 20-24, 25-29, 30-34: OECD Stat, Education and Training, Students 
enrolled by age (all levels of education, all educational programmes, full-time)  
* Part-time students in age groups 20-24, 25-29, 30-34: OECD Stat, Education and Training, Students 
enrolled by age (all levels of education, all educational programmes). We subtracted the data for full-
time students from those for ‘full-time and part-time students’.  
Data are available in 1995-2006. However, for many countries (quite) some years are missing. Period 
averages are computed on the basis of all available annual data.  
 
Average effective retirement age (1995-2006) 
Definition: Average age of all persons (being 40 or older) withdrawing from the labor force in a given 
period.   
Data source: OECD, Ageing and Employment Policies – Statistics on average effective age of retirement. 
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Annual real potential per capita GDP growth rate (aggregate, 1995-2007) 
Definition: Annual growth rate of real potential GDP per person of working age 
Data sources:  
* real potential GDP: OECD Statistical Compendium, Economic Outlook, supply block, series GDPVTR. 
* population at working age: OECD Statistical Compendium, Economic Outlook, labour markets, series 
POPT. 
 
Tax rate on labor income (τw) 
Definition: Total tax wedge, marginal tax rate in % of gross wage earnings. The data cover personal 
income taxes, employee and employer social security contributions payable on wage earnings and 
payroll taxes.  
Data source: OECD, Statistical Compendium, Financial and Fiscal Affairs, Taxing Wages, Comparative tax 
rates and benefits (new definition). 
The OECD publishes marginal labor tax rates for several family and income situations: single persons at 
67%, 100% and 167% of average earnings (no children), single persons at 67% of average earnings (two 
children), one-earner married couples at 100% of average earnings (two children), two-earner married 
couples, one at 100% of average earnings and the other at 33 % (no children, 2 children), two-earner 
married couples, one at 100% of average earnings and the other at 67 % (2 children). Our data in Table 3 
are the averages of these eight cases. Data for 2000-04. 
 
Government debt (Dt) 
Definition: General government gross financial liabilities.  
Data source: OECD Statistical Compendium, Economic Outlook, N° 89, Government Accounts. 
 
Net benefit replacement rates when young and middle aged (b) 
Definition: The data concern net transfers received by long-term unemployed people and include social 
assistance, family benefits and housing benefits in the 60
th
 month of benefit receipt. They also include 
unemployment insurance or unemployment assistance benefits if these benefits are still paid, i.e. if 
workers can be structurally unemployed for more than five years without losing benefit eligibility. The 
data are expressed in % of after-tax wages. The OECD provides net replacement rates for six family 
situations and three earnings levels. Our data in Table 4 are the averages of these 18 cases. Data for 
2001-04. 
Data source: OECD, Tax-Benefit Models, www.oecd.org/els/social/workincentives 
Data adjustment: Original OECD data for Norway include the so-called “waiting benefit” (ventestønad), 
which a person could get after running out of unemployment benefits. Given the conditional nature of 
these “waiting benefits”, they do not match our definition of benefits paid to structurally non-employed 
individuals. We have therefore deducted them from the OECD data, which led to a reduction of net 
replacement rates by about 19 percentage points. For example, recipients should demonstrate high 
regional mobility and willingness to take a job anywhere in Norway. The “waiting benefit” was 
terminated in 2008. We thank Tatiana Gordine at the OECD for clarifying this issue with us.   
 
Early retirement replacement rates (ber) 
To calculate our proxy for ber we have focused on the possibility for older workers in some countries to 
leave the labor market along fairly generous early retirement routes. Duval (2003) and Brandt et al. 
(2005) provide data for the so-called implicit tax rate on continued work for five more years in the early 
retirement route at age 55 and age 60. The idea is as follows. If an individual stops working (instead of 
continuing for five more years), he receives a benefit (early retirement, disability…) and no longer pays 
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contributions for his future pension. A potential disadvantage is that he may receive a lower pension 
later, since he contributed less during active life. Duval (2003) calculated the difference between the 
present value of the gains and the costs of early retirement, in percent of gross earnings before 
retirement. We use his data as a proxy for the gross benefit replacement rate for older workers in the 
early retirement route. To compute the net benefit replacement rate, we assume the same tax rate on 
early retirement benefits as on unemployment benefits. We call this net benefit replacement rate rer. 
However, these implicit tax rates are only very rough estimates of the real incentive to retire embedded 
in early retirement schemes and are subject to important caveats (Duval, 2003, p. 15). The available 
implicit tax rates take into account neither the strictness of eligibility criteria nor the presence of 
alternative social transfer programs that may de facto be used as early retirement devices. Our 
assumption will be that a realistic replacement rate for the early retirement route (ber) will be a weighted 
average of rer and b, where we take the latter as a proxy for the replacement rate in alternative social 
transfer programs. If rer > b, older workers will aim for the official early retirement route, but they may 
not all meet eligibility criteria and have to fall back on alternative programs. If rer < b, workers will aim for 
the alternative, but again they may not be eligible. We propose that ber = ξb + (1-ξ)rer. Underlying the 
data in Table 4 is the assumption that ξ=0.5. Correlation between ber and rer lies around 0.92. Cross-
country differences roughly remain intact. Our results in the main text do not depend in any serious way 
on this assumption for ξ.  
Data Source: OECD, Tax-Benefit Models, www.oecd.org/els/social/workincentives, Duval (2003), Brandt 
et al. (2005).  
 
Net pension replacement rates (GA  and GI for a=L,M,H) 
OECD (2005, p. 52) presents net pension replacement rates for individuals at various multiples of  
average individual earnings in the economy. We consider the data for individuals at 50% of average  
earnings as representative for the low ability group, individuals with average earnings as representative 
for the medium ability group, and individuals with twice average earnings as representative for the high 
ability group. Country studies in OECD (2005, part II) show the composition (sources) of this net 
replacement rate. This composition may be different for individuals with different income levels. Our 
proxy for GA  includes all earnings-related pensions and mandatory occupational pensions when they 
depend on wages or hours worked. Our proxy for GI includes basic pensions, minimum pensions, 
targeted pensions, and old-age social assistance benefits, i.e. all categories that are not (or even 
inversely) related to individual earnings.  
Since in our model GI is a percentage of the average net wage in the economy (Equation 9), 
whereas the above described OECD data are in percent of an individual’s net wage, we multiply the 
OECD data with the ratio of the replacement in percent of average earnings to the replacement rate in 
percent of individual earnings to obtain our GI. This ratio can be derived from the ‘pension modelling’ 
tables in the individual country studies, at various multiples of average earnings. 
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Appendix 2: Detail on calibration procedure to determine  and { (with 
 = 	, , ) 
 
Given the data for US relative wages in Table 2, we have for the low-ability group that:  
 
A[,YV1[YAX,YV1XY = A[,Y[V1X
Y
AX,YV1XY = A[,YAX,Y P5 = 0.43. 
We also know from Equation (26) that 
A[,YAX,Y = ´[´X -MX,YM[,Y 3
1µ
, which implies for the US: 
´[´X -MX,YM[,Y 3
1µ = ¶. [ = ¶. ¶.·¸ = 0.66.  
Similarly, it is easy to obtain for the medium ability group: 
´Z´X -MX,YMZ,Y3
1µ = ¶.·Z = ¶.·¶.¹¸ = 0.76. 
 
If we finally take into account that M = 1 − N − 5, and we introduce values for M,/N,  and M,/5, which we simultaneously obtain elsewhere in the calibration (as functions of the employment 
rates and H5, HN and HM, which themselves depend on {5, {N and {M), it is easy to see that we have 
three remaining equations in three unknowns (M , N , 5) that can be solved. 
 
Along the same line of reasoning, we obtain values for {5 , {N and {M  such that our model matches the 
relative wages of middle aged low and medium ability workers for the US, as well as the target value for 
education (e) over all 13 countries. The direct link between φ5 , φN , φM  and education, and these relative 
wages, is obvious from the following two equations:   
 
A[,YVW[Y41AX,YVWXY41 = A[,Yk[
Y41[V1XY41AX,YkXY41V1XY41 = A[,Yk[
Y41
AX,YkXY41 0.673 = 0.38.  AZ,YVWZY41AX,YVWXY41 = AZ,YkZ
Y41ZV1XY41AX,YkXY41V1XY41 = AZ,YkZ
Y41
AX,YkXY41 0.837 = 0.58. 
 
 
where we know that H5, HN  and HM are functions of {5, {N and {M respectively and N and M. 
Furthermore, also <5/<M and <N/<M depend on these parameters via M/5 and M/N as we have 
shown above.  
 
 
 
